



Simulating ADS-B Attacks in Air Traffic Management



Anton Blåberg



Gustav Lindahl



Billy Josefsson



Andrei Gurtov



Agenda

- Aim
- What have been done?
- ADS-B
- Simulators
- Gameplay
- Conclusion
- Future work



Aim

- Why is it an important topic?



Aim

- Cybersecurity interest growing, but not in aviation
- Lack of security in air traffic communication
- Not encrypted
- Risk of attacks
- Prepare future ATCOs to handle attacks



What have we done?


- Compared two different air traffic controller simulators
- Modified the chosen simulator to show attacks
- Feedback from real Air Traffic Controller
- Updated the simulator after feedback from test



ADS-B



Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)



Segment	Downlink Format	Capability	Aircraft Address	ADS-B Data	Parity Check
Bits	5	3	24	56	24



Simulators




Choosing a simulator

- **Open source project**
- Popular and well developed
- Smooth installation process for developers and users



BlueSky


- Open sourced
- Not so popular
- Played locally on computer





openScope

- Open sourced
- Popular and flourishing community
- Played through the browser





Comparison

Comparison		
Simulator	openScope	BlueSky
Main programming language	JavaScript	Python
Installation time in seconds	210	680
Contributors	75	18
Active branches	15	2
GitHub stars	304	110
LOC (Main language)	15861	21044
LOC (Total)	400399	34437



Gameplay




Types of attacks in the paper

- Aircraft not responding to commands
- Aircraft randomly changing position
- Aircraft displaying false data

Aircraft not responding to commands


15






Aircraft randomly changing position

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Aircraft displaying false data

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Test with feedback from real ATCO


- Improvements to existing attacks
- New attacks
- New QoL changes



Types of attacks today


- Aircraft not responding to commands
- Aircraft randomly changing position
- Aircraft displaying false data
- Stationary aircraft
- Flooding of non-responsive aircraft

Stationary aircraft



Flooding of non-responsive aircraft

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Starting Settings:

Percentage of aircraft affected: No aircraft affected
 Aircraft not responding to commands: 0
 Aircraft changing position: 0
 Aircraft showing false data: 0
 Aircraft will stand still: 0
 Flooding of non-responsive aircraft: None
 Probability of jumps: Medium
 Distance of jumps: Moderate radius
 Color code attack aircraft: No

Changes made through the game

Timestamp (s): Changes made:
 22.6: Created 60 new non-responsive aircraft
 25.2: Changed attack aircraft visibility to "Yes"
 57.9: Created 0 new non-responsive aircraft
 60.8: Changed attack aircraft visibility to "Yes"

Commands used while playing

Timestamp (s):Aircraft:Command:Attacktype:
 43.6:SJY748:showType, :Non listen
 48.8:SJY748:heading, left,90,true:Non listen



Discussion and conclusion



Discussion

- All attacks stem from real weaknesses of ADS-B
- Feedback from ATCO, and the improvements we did
- Impact on the aviation community
- Ethical dilemma?



Conclusion

- Does not bring up new flaws with ADS-B, rather a reminder of the flaws
- Great tool to get an understanding of how ATCOs react to attacks
- Future systems like LDACS are far away



Future Work

- Further testing with real ATCOs
- New and improved system to analyze the logfile
- Try the simulator at zebraland.ida.liu.se
- Email comments and queries to gurtov@acm.org



Thank you for listening!